Sages, Savages, and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture in Comparative Law by Eppinger, Monica
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 57 
Number 2 Invisible Constitutions: Culture, 
Religion, and Memory (Winter 2013) 
Article 7 
2013 
Sages, Savages, and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture in 
Comparative Law 
Monica Eppinger 
Saint Louis University School of Law, meppinge@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Monica Eppinger, Sages, Savages, and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture in Comparative Law, 57 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol57/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
407 
SAGES, SAVAGES, AND OTHER SPEECH ACT COMMUNITIES: 
CULTURE IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
MONICA EPPINGER* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article re-examines the possible utility of the concept of culture in 
comparative law. It reviews some limits and misuses of the concept of culture 
and introduces a components approach to using it in comparative analysis. 
First presented at a Symposium inspired by Laurence Tribe’s The Invisible 
Constitution, the Article takes up a key question emerging from Tribe’s work: 
How does a constitution constitute? Two conceptual tools from anthropology 
and sister disciplines, performative speech acts and performance theory, lend 
insight into how discourse produces literal meaning and, in parallel, produces 
and reproduces speech act communities. Having introduced a components 
approach to undertaking comparative work, the Article then suggests putting 
the pieces back together; to demonstrate how a holistic treatment of culture 
might be deployed in larger projects, the Article reviews one against racism 
and another against ideology-based assertions of group superiority. With a 
more analytical look at the work of “constituting” and with new tools for 
studying it, the Article concludes that the concept of culture can facilitate 
comparative analysis not only between different national jurisdictions, but also 
between different speech act communities (like law and religion) within a 
given jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of culture holds a paradoxical place in the field of 
comparative law. On one hand, culture can be helpful in understanding and 
comparing law across different jurisdictions and normative orders. Some 
would even call culture indispensible to, or inseparable from, the project of 
comparative law. On the other hand, the concept of culture is often vaguely 
understood and the term “culture” wrongly or haphazardly used. Because some 
misunderstand culture, they miss opportunities to deploy the concept 
effectively. Worse, misused, the concept of culture can become a tool for 
miscasting others and doing violence to their identities. This Article briefly 
explores both sides of the paradox, considering utility and limits of the concept 
of culture in comparative law. 
The goal is to add some specificity to our understanding of the concept of 
culture in order to harness the best and avoid the worst it may offer. I look to 
anthropology, the discipline in the U.S. academy that pioneered the study of 
culture, for tools useful to those seeking to understand law and its workings in 
comparative perspective. My argument here is not primarily an ontological one 
over the existence or non-existence of “culture.” Rather, it comes from a 
practical acceptance that the concept of culture has pragmatic effect and must 
be reckoned with. 
The 2012 Center for International and Comparative Law Symposium at 
which this paper was presented took inspiration from constitutional scholar 
Lawrence Tribe’s recent work, The Invisible Constitution.1 This Article takes 
Tribe’s discussion as a point of departure for considering culture. I analyze 
Tribe’s argument, characterize the mechanisms he identifies, and use some 
tools from anthropology to address anew Tribe’s central research question. 
This is done as an experiment, something of a “proof of concept,” for adapting 
the anthropological tool kit to comparative law. Reference to Tribe’s work is 
meant to be illustrative. The body of the argument itself has two main points: 
caution and explanation. 
Part I reviews Tribe’s propositions for how the invisible Constitution has 
been generated. It then explores the concept of culture in relation to the 
invisible Constitution, explaining why one might characterize the genre of the 
mechanism he identifies as “culture” (despite his protestations). Part II 
explores how the study of culture can help in a project like Tribe’s. It proposes 
a “components method” and reviews two lines of work, performative speech 
acts and performance theory, which anthropology and sister disciplines have 
developed that give insight into how a constitution might do the work of 
constituting, e.g., how speech acts create social reality. This leads to 
consideration of frames of performance, within which discourse produces 
 
 1. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008). 
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literal meaning and, in parallel, produces and reproduces speech act 
communities. Part III describes some limits and misuses of the concept of 
culture in comparative analysis. Armed with a dual understanding of the work 
of “constituting” and cautioned against pitfalls, Part IV reintroduces culture 
with a look at two major projects in which it has been deployed, resituating 
speech act analysis within a broader context and drawing on the work of two 
anthropologists, Franz Boas and Laura Nader, to illustrate some further benefit 
of considering culture. 
The Article concludes with a consideration of the possible utility of the 
concept of culture for comparative law, showing how tools from anthropology 
allow us to describe and explain the constitution of different kinds of 
communities defined by speech acts, including law and religion. This 
facilitates comparative analysis not only between different national 
jurisdictions, as is the dominant tradition in comparative law, but also between 
different speech act communities (like law and religion) within a given 
national jurisdiction. More fundamentally, it may help us understand how 
authority or power works in different speech acts communities and to compare 
how the forces that constitute are produced and reproduced. The piece should 
point the reader towards equipment for analyzing with greater nuance how the 
Constitution and other authorized speech acts constitute, when the focus is not 
what a constitution says, but on how it does what it does. It is this focus that 
arises in dialogue with Tribe.2 
I.  TAKING THE INVISIBLE SERIOUSLY 
A. The Invisible Constitution 
The Invisible Constitution, constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe’s 
recent work, raises a question that would seem central to the study of 
constitutions but is rarely considered: How does the Constitution constitute? 
After all, Tribe points out, the Constitution leaves many gaps that will 
inevitably give rise to disputes. However, it does not also in its text give a rule 
for its interpretation.3 Tribe makes a case for the existence of propositions and 
precepts not written in—but nonetheless part of—the Constitution, arguing for 
the “existence of extratextual content” as part of the Constitution.4 In other 
words, Tribe sees smoke (the existence of certain patterns of behavior by those 
acting in response to the Constitution) and infers fire. Describing that fire is the 
aim of his book. 
 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 22. 
 3. Id. at 4. 
 4. Margaret Raymond, Book Review, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 466, 466 (2008–2010) 
(reviewing Tribe’s The Invisible Constitution). 
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Tribe, in his own words, is not trying to add to the body of literature on 
who is doing the interpreting or what is invisible around the constitution. In 
investigating this “invisible constitution,” Tribe means to exclude what he 
considers outside the text, the “complex superstructure of rules, doctrines, 
standards, legal tests, judicial precedents, legislative and executive practices, 
and cultural and social traditions that together constitute what people call 
‘constitutional law.’”5 Instead, he focuses on what must be “‘in’ the United 
States Constitution but cannot be seen when one reads only its text.”6 In, 
outside, around: metaphors of space are indispensible to Tribe’s project but are 
left undefined by him. 
In the discussion to follow, I use the basic question Tribe raises, “How 
does a Constitution constitute?”, to undertake a broader reconsideration of 
culture in comparative law. Reexamination entails redrawing some of the 
boundaries by which Tribe marks what is intrinsic or extrinsic to his 
discussion. Most generally, Tribe says “culture” falls outside of the scope of 
his discussion. In examining his data and his claims, however, I find his 
material is indistinguishable from “culture,” as technically defined by 
anthropology. I then try to restore to him tools that the prior study of culture 
has developed to make sense of it, tools of which he robs himself by separating 
his topic from “culture.” The subsequent parts of this section explain how I get 
from point A to point B, and why it matters. 
B. Invisible Constitution and Culture 
To begin, let’s consider Tribe’s challenge and how he tackles it. Tribe, 
convinced that the “invisible Constitution” is at the heart of the Constitution’s 
meaning, aims to move “the nation’s constitutional conversation away from 
debates over what the Constitution says and whether various constitutional 
claims are properly rooted in its written text and toward debates over what the 
Constitution does.”7 To do this, he undertakes to describe the content, “both 
written and unwritten,” of the Constitution.8 
In this pursuit, he makes several analytical moves. First, he identifies a set 
of axiomatic propositions that “go beyond anything that could reasonably be 
said to follow simply from what the Constitution expressly says,”9 for 
example: 
Ours is a “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” 
Ours is a “government of laws, not men.” 
 
 5. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 10. 
 6. Id. at 13. 
 7. Id. at 22. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 28. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
412 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:407 
We are committed to the “rule of law.” 
Courts must not automatically defer to what elected officials decide the 
Constitution means. 
Government may not torture people to force information out of them. 
In each person’s intimate private life, there are limits to what government may 
control. 
Congress may not commandeer states as though they were agencies or 
departments of the federal government. 
No state may secede from the Union.10 
After discussing evidence (in doctrine and judicial decisions) that for him 
supports that each one of those propositions exists, Tribe describes logical 
processes by which, per his inference, the content of the invisible Constitution 
has been generated. He identifies three constructive principles: geometric 
construction (“connecting the dots”);11 geodesic construction (surfaces that 
surround an interior defined by a core right or principle whose realization 
requires “space buffered from outside forces by a suitably designed shield”);12 
and global construction (“comparison of our national experience with the 
experiences and experiments of other nations and of international groupings, 
institutions, and practices”).13 He adds three deconstructive “modes of 
construction,” deconstructive in that they “entail imagining how the 
Constitution would break down or fall apart unless certain assumptions were 
made”:14 geological construction (unearthing the roots or presumptions of 
textually identified rights);15 gravitational construction (“the ‘anti-slippery-
slope’ mode”);16 and gyroscopic construction (a Constitution stabilized by both 
centripetal and centrifugal vector forces).17 In short, Tribe observes the smoke 
of axiomatic propositions and infers the fire of cognitive patterns (or 
“principles,” in his terminology) that explains their generation. In what genre 
do his “principles” fall, and through what paradigm of analysis might they be 
apprehended? 
Although Tribe specifies that culture lies outside of the domain he wants to 
consider, I propose that instead that “culture,” canonically defined, is exactly 
what he is attempting to describe. “Culture,” as a technical term in 
anthropology, is canonically characterized as “all the elements in man’s [sic] 
 
 10. Id. at 28−29. 
 11. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 157. 
 12. Id. at 172. 
 13. Id. at 181. 
 14. Id. at 155–56. 
 15. Id. at 189. 
 16. Id. at 198. 
 17. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 207. 
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mature endowment that he has acquired from his group by conscious learning 
or by a conditioning process.”18 This might mean a “systematic body of 
learned behavior” transmitted from prior to subsequent generations.19 In the 
tradition of American anthropology, culture is understood as material and 
ideational,20 manifest in institutions, material objects, and thought patterns.21 
Tribe identifies two phenomena, 1) propositions22 that form the content of the 
invisible Constitution, and 2) forms of logical reasoning or principles of 
constitutional construction—in other words, patterns of cognition—that Tribe 
speculates give rise to the propositions. I propose that both of these phenomena 
would be considered integral to culture in the canonical understanding of 
“culture” in anthropology. 
My first challenge to his model is to a distinction he draws between 
interior and exterior. Tribe locates both the propositions and the cognitive 
patterns, or “principles,” “in” the Constitution although they are not seen or 
written there, interior yet invisible.23 In this, he distinguishes them from other 
devices (a “complex superstructure” of practices and “cultural and social 
traditions”) that are neither in the written Constitution nor even his “invisible” 
Constitution.24 He may be using the word “culture” colloquially, but it is worth 
pointing out this point of dissonance. The propositions and the principles Tribe 
identifies are patterns of cognition and practice that anthropology would 
identify as manifestations of culture. If Tribe’s extratextual propositions are 
“in” the Constitution, then culture is in the Constitution. 
Incidentally, in considering patterns of cognition, Tribe shares ground with 
other recent forays in legal scholarship that identify patterns of thought and use 
them as bases for explanation of outcomes of legal argument or policy 
 
 18. MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL DYNAMICS 3 (abr. ed. 1964). 
 19. Margaret Mead, Preface to RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE xi, xi (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1989) (1934). 
 20. See, e.g., Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, address at the International College 
of Arts and Science, St. Louis, September 1904, as published in 5 CONGRESS OF ARTS AND 
SCIENCE 468 (H. J. Rogers, ed. 1906), reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF 
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 23, 23 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974) 
(“[A]nthropologists occupy themselves with problems relating to the physical and mental life of 
mankind as found in varying forms of society . . . .”). 
 21. HERSKOVITS, supra note 18, at 3. 
 22. These propositions, see supra text accompanying note 10, seem to be of different genres: 
some precepts, others ideologies, others hypotheses, etc. Without delving into further analysis, I 
refer to them generally as “propositions.” 
 23. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 13−29. 
 24. Id. at 10. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
414 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:407 
debate.25 The most prolific of these recent efforts, unlike Tribe, does identify 
cognition as a manifestation of culture.26 
C. Question Asked Versus Question Answered 
I propose that two research questions are central to Tribe’s project: the 
question he raises, and the question he answers. Summarizing from his 
description of his project, the basic question that he raises is, how does the 
Constitution constitute?27 Tribe hypothesizes the existence of invisible 
elements that are not written in the Constitution, but that somehow control how 
the Constitution is interpreted and thus are inextricably a part of it. Those 
elements may be received unspoken cues; they recall the cues in Bateson’s 
example that tell a bear cub when its sibling is biting in play versus when its 
sibling is biting in aggression, which determine the interpretation of two 
different communicative acts that in their formal aspects look identical.28 
Alternatively, those elements may be patterns of thought or habits of mind that 
give rise to the same or similar inferences in different individuals reading the 
same text. Putting aside for a moment the exact nature of the extratextual 
phenomena, I will refer to them for now in general terms as “metadiscursive 
devices.” Accordingly, I would rephrase Tribe’s central research question as, 
how do metadiscursive devices generate the invisible Constitution? 
That, however, is different than the question I find that he answers in his 
work. The question he answers is, instead, more along the lines of, assuming 
that an “invisible Constitution” exists, i.e., assuming a set of metadiscursive 
cues do guide constitutional interpretation but are not specified in the 
Constitution itself, which ones can I identify as the content of the invisible 
Constitution? Taking his set of propositions, his answer to that question, as 
true for the sake of argument, we are still left with the questions of how and 
whence those principles or patterns of cognition arise. Tribe seems to be 
making an argument about discourse formation in U.S. constitutional 
jurisprudence, suggesting relationships between language and patterns of 
cognition. 
This leads back to the intellectual heritage of anthropology. Language 
specialists and American cultural anthropologists have long investigated 
 
 25. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A 
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1294–95 (2003). 
 26. For work using cognition as a manifestation of culture more generally, see THE 
CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, www.culturalcognition.net (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2012). 
 27. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1−8. 
 28. For analysis of signaling devices taking animal biting in play versus aggression as its 
central example, see Gregory Bateson, A Theory of Play and Fantasy, in GREGORY BATESON, 
STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 179 (Chandler Pub. Co., 1972). 
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relationships between language and cognition,29 developing conceptual tools 
for the task. In this Part, I have argued that, under technical definitions offered 
by anthropology, Tribe has misdiagnosed his problem and may thus have 
missed some tools that could aid his project. In the next Part, I describe some 
of them. First, I propose a possible starting point for those considering the 
concept of culture in comparative legal analysis, and then I describe a few 
examples of the conceptual tools it may place at their disposal. 
II.  THE WORK OF CONSTITUTING 
A. Getting Started 
I propose as a first step towards reconceptualizing culture, we draw an 
analogy from physics. One may think about culture, I propose, in the way that 
contemporary physics conceives the atom.30 An atom is composed of building 
blocks, i.e., protons, neutrons, and electrons. To visualize where an electron 
may be located in relation to the protons and neutrons of a nucleus, physics 
proposes the image of a cloud,31 denser in some areas than others, depicting the 
set of probabilities that an electron may be observed; the denser the cloud, the 
more likely an electron may be observed. A set of probabilities, then, describes 
the relationship between nucleus and electrons. We might similarly think of 
culture as a set of probabilities of relations. These could be relations between 
people, between ideas, or other building blocks. The building blocks or the 
relations between them could then be subject to analysis. 
A related methodological suggestion comes from British social 
anthropologist Adam Kuper, who harbors some skepticism about the concept 
of “culture.”32 Kuper suggests that an investigator think through carefully what 
she has in mind and analyze the components of what is lumped under the term 
“culture” separately and specifically. Instead of “culture,” for example, Kuper 
suggests analyzing language, religion, family, law, or another component of 
culture relevant to the question at hand.33 
Taking Kuper’s advice—not using “culture” as an explanatory principle 
and instead breaking down and analyzing components of culture relevant to a 
 
 29. See, e.g., BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Science and Linguistics, in COLLECTED PAPERS ON 
METALINGUISTICS 1, 5 (1952); Edward Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, 74 
SCI. 578, 578 (1931). 
 30. The information for this analogy comes from Nuclear Energy, SNEWS, available at 
http://snews.bnl.gov/popsci/nuclear-energy.html. 
 31. The “cloud” is a metaphor for Schrödinger’s “wave function.” See generally Erwin 
Schrödinger, An Undulatory Theory of the Mechanics of Atoms and Molecules, 28 PHYSICAL 
REV. 1049 (1926). 
 32. See generally ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT (1999). See 
infra Part III for discussion of a few of my points of caution. 
 33. Id. at 245. 
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particular research question—I return to looking at law as a discursive practice 
and in particular looking at how constitutions constitute. To illustrate how 
Kuper’s approach might work, in the rest of this Part, I isolate one component 
of culture relevant to Tribe’s project, language, to look at how speech, 
language, and other communicative practices work to construct social reality. 
B. Performative Speech 
One component particularly relevant for the project of explaining how 
metadiscursive cues help to construct an invisible Constitution is speech or 
speech acts. John Austin’s work on performative speech acts may get us 
started. Austin distinguishes cases in which language is used to represent 
reality, “constative utterances,” from cases in which words create reality, 
“performative utterances.”34 In law school, much of what we study is how to 
execute effectively performative speech acts: a contract is a performative 
speech act; a verdict is a performative speech act. These are not instances of 
language representing but of language creating. That is my first proposal from 
reflecting on how constitutions constitute: constitutions constitute through 
performative speech acts. 
Austin indicates that not every attempted use of speech to create reality 
does create reality. What aspects distinguish the performative deployment of a 
sign-type? He identifies “felicity conditions,” conditions that must be satisfied 
for a performative to be effective in creating social reality.35 One is 
convention: “accepted conventional procedure”36 must be followed to execute 
a performative utterance. Following convention may be interpreted as 
evidencing a certain inner state,37 which is itself a separate felicity condition.38 
To be taken seriously, as opposed to, say, joking or writing a poem, a speaker 
must render a performative utterance, in accordance with an accepted custom, 
as an “outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for 
information, of an inward and spiritual act.”39 
The felicity of an Austinian performative depends on a third pre-existing 
social form, authority. One test of the felicity of a performative utterance for 
Austin is whether the particular persons and circumstances in a given case are 
 
 34. J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 47 (photo. reprint 1967) (1962). For 
description, and critique, of a logical parallel from the history of comparative law, see Monica 
Eppinger, Governing in the Vernacular: Eugen Ehrlich and Late Habsburg Ethnography, in 
LIVING LAW: RECONSIDERING EUGEN EHRLICH 21, 24–25 (Marc Hertogh ed., 2009). 
 35. AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 14−15. 
 36. Id. at 14, 26. Austin refers to convention elsewhere by such terms as “ceremon[y],” id. at 
76, or “formula,” id. at 60. 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. Id. at 15. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
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appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved.40 This 
makes the effect of an utterance dependent on a historical moment and a social 
and cultural setting; for example, the social roles of speaker and listener 
determine the appropriate convention for a performative utterance. Authorized 
(or “ratified,” in Erving Goffman’s term)41 speakers derive authority from an 
implicit feature of Austin’s model, context.42 
The felicity conditions may provide points of focus for our work in 
comparative law. In Austin’s suggestions for how to evaluate effectiveness of 
performatives, we are directed to mechanisms—convention, affective state, 
authority—that determine what kinds of propositions rise to a sense of an 
“invisible constitution” and which ones sink to “sound and fury, signifying 
nothing.”43 Examination of the substance of those felicity conditions inevitably 
leads us to other components of culture that should then be included in our 
analysis. 
Let me offer an example: I conducted fieldwork in law and social change, 
i.e., in how performative speech acts work to constitute social reality, in post-
Soviet Ukraine.44 It was through performative speech acts that a giant, well-
armed country disappeared from world maps without a shot fired, and reality 
was changed. Did Soviet structures of thought, action, self-formation, or 
identity disappear overnight, in all ways, for everybody? No. Structures 
remained, evacuated of some content, but structuring structures nonetheless. 
We can observe what new content is filling those structures, areas of slippage, 
innovations in performance, and through those observations, we can “reverse 
engineer” and infer who created the authority to create what came next. We 
can understand how power is getting constituted within this ruptured context. 
As this example shows, analyzing one component of culture with tools 
developed for the task can illuminate broader aspects of law, culture, and 
society in comparative perspective. 
While Austinian performatives offer a promising start, searching the 
history of utterances for performative felicity—identifying performative 
speech acts—is not entirely satisfying, in part because it is not peculiar to 
constitutions. It is the way law generally works. It is also, by the way, how 
some parts of religious tradition also work. (In some religious stories of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, we put words into the mouth of God, 
 
 40. Id. at 15, 34. 
 41. Erving Goffman, The Neglected Situation, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 61, 65 
(Pier Paolo Giglioli ed., 1972). 
 42. AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 76 (one of the devices that can convey that a given utterance is 
meant to be performative is “the circumstances of the utterance”). 
 43. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5. 
 44. For a summary of the research project, see Monica Eppinger, Parliamentarians, 
Farmers, and Other Legal Subjects: Law and Experimentation in Independent Ukraine, 
ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, December 2012, at 5. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
418 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:407 
casting God in the role of maker of performative speech. “‘Let there be light,’ 
and there was light,”45 is a paradigmatic example of how words create, in our 
cosmology.) Performative speech acts work in different kinds of language 
communities, not just legal communities—in religious communities, and other 
kinds of communities. 
The bill that Representative Paul Curtman introduced into the Missouri 
legislature outlawing the use of “foreign law” in Missouri court decisions46 (a 
project discussed with Representative Curtman at the 2012 CICL 
Symposium),47 reminds us that there are different spheres of authority, and 
there are different ways that authority gets constituted. Representative Curtman 
may be wrong in conflating religious community with legal community and in 
perceiving a minority community’s speech acts as threatening, or even 
relevant, to the majority secular legal community; but Curtman’s alarm still 
signifies a certain kind of structural assessment of commensurability of 
performative speech, and thereby of legitimacy of authority, and in that, 
perhaps, a form of respect. 
C. Performance 
This begs the question, then: If words can create social reality, and if the 
felicity of a performative utterance depends on certain features like authority, 
convention, and context, then where do those features come from? In addition 
to Austinian performative speech, linguistic anthropology suggests another 
way that words create reality, this time over longer duration, in a body of work 
called performance theory.48 In analyzing performance, we see how repetition 
over time also creates reality. It takes a short ceremony, punctuated by a brief 
set of performative utterances, for two people to become newlyweds. It takes 
significantly longer to establish the convention or ceremony by which two 
people may become married. It takes reiteration, a kind of repeat performance 
over time; it also takes acceptability, performing in a way that will be accepted 
by the audience.49 The features of Austin’s felicity conditions—those features 
upon which performatives are premised, like convention and authority—take 
time to accumulate. This indicates one relationship between performance and 
 
 45. Genesis 1:3. 
 46. Mo. H.B. No. 1512, 96th General Assembly, Second Regular Session, “An Act to 
Amend Chapter 506, RSMo, by Adding thereto One New Section relating to the laws of other 
countries,” (2011). 
 47. Rep. Paul Curtman, Remarks at Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium: 
Invisible Constitutions (Mar. 2, 2012), http://slu.edu/school-of-law-home/faculty-and-administra 
tion/news-and-events/events/culture-religion-and-memory/videos. 
 48. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, Performances, in THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE 17 (1973). 
 49. Id. at 17 (“When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take 
seriously the impression that is fostered before them.”). 
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performativity. The felicity of performative speech acts depends on frames of 
performance,50 which are themselves created over time by repetition. 
In this understanding of “performance,” a performance frame is not 
something that one enters, as into a temporary, artificial setting only to exit 
back to reality. Rather, in this understanding of performance, one steps from 
frame into frame. “All the world’s a stage,” as Shakespeare tells us,51 or at 
least all the world’s one stage after another, wherein each stage is a set of 
probabilities that the performance that one is making might not be accepted by 
one’s audience. As Professor An-Na’im points out, we all have—or rather, 
perform—multiple identities.52 An uncountable and sometimes uncomfortable 
number of identities. We cultivate or embody multiple identities in part in 
order to engage in the co-creation of reality with the people with whom we 
interact. Culture in both its ideational and material manifestations provides the 
setting for performance, the framing. Frames of performance define the 
domain, or fields, of probability that the audience will participate in the co-
creation of reality over long duration. This is not to claim that every 
performative speech act or performance bears equal weight or influence on 
subsequent ones. It is, however, to give each performance its due as an 
experience in its own right and for its role in the reproduction of performance 
frames. To re-purpose Bruce Ackerman’s term,53 in the practice of law, then, 
each moment is a small-c constitutional moment, a moment of constitution, 
construction, re-creation, creation anew.54 
What is at stake in all of this? Speech acts are the building blocks of 
discourses of inclusion and exclusion. They create in-groups and out-groups. 
Are we going to outlaw the application of some foreign law doctrines in state 
court? Are we going to say that certain kinds of speech acts are not going to be 
performative in our context? What is “our” context? Does that not depend on 
who we think “we” are? And does not our answer determine who “we” will or 
can be tomorrow? It is via a dialogic process between speakers and audiences 
that social reality is constituted. When we repeat speech acts in certain 
 
 50. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
EXPERIENCE 22 (Northeastern University Press 1986) (1974). 
 51. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7. 
 52. Abullahi An-Na’im, Banning Sharia is a “Red Herring”: The Way Forward for All 
Americans, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 295 (2013). 
 53. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 87 (1998). 
 54. In this formulation of the temporality at issue, at least, I find common ground with Tribe. 
See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 6 (stating a major difference between other scholars’ approaches and 
his is that “they focus on the way crucial turning points in our constitutional history 
(‘constitutional moments’) depend for their legitimacy on sources of law outside the 
Constitution’s text, whereas I focus on the way the Constitution at every moment depends on 
extratextual sources of meaning”). 
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discursive traditions, we are making choices about who’s in and who’s out, 
who is authorized to create certain forms of reality and who is not. Culture and 
individuals are, in this vision of the constituting process, co-creative. 
The prior Parts aimed first at using Tribe’s “invisible constitution” to 
illustrate some conceptual tools American anthropology has developed from 
past study of culture and then at equipping the comparative legal scholar with 
them. Despite the utility of bringing the concept of culture to bear on 
comparative legal analysis, some serious misgivings about arguing for its 
adoption arise. To address some of them, the next Part issues a few caveats 
about the limits and possible misuses of the concept of culture. 
III.  CAUTIONING AGAINST CULTURE: FOUR COMMON PITFALLS 
A. Stasis 
Caution would warn us away from taking our notion of culture too 
literally, for several reasons. Culture, understood as learned or inherited 
elements,55 has long been easily confused with tradition. The repetition or 
reproduction of culture without change (literally, stereotyping56), has proved 
untrue in every known human group yet studied. There is no such thing as a 
human group living unchanged over time. Tradition may function as a 
performance frame, but it too changes with reiteration. The existence of 
tradition should not be confused for its tyranny. When faced with groups that 
seem to have something in common with our imagination of our own past, or 
our imagination of the other group’s past, then we are apt to overlook 
iterability, emergence, or slippage. Given long prior association of the concept 
of culture with the idea of tradition, the tendency for confusion is rampant. The 
concept of culture should be avoided if it abets an assumption of stasis. 
B. Reification 
Using the concept of culture is even more problematic when we observers 
and scholars enlist it in self-deception, allowing our understanding of culture, a 
construct in the mind of the beholder57 to become confused with culture as an a 
priori object. As one anthropologist warned a half-century ago, 
 
 55. See Mead, supra note 19. 
 56. Originally, “stereotype” referred to a duplicate printing plate in a press, used to stamp 
identical copies of typography. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 54−55 (1922) 
(adopting of this image as a metaphor for human perception of others). 
 57. See, e.g., PAUL RABINOW, Humanism as Nihilism: The Bracketing of Truth and 
Seriousness in American Anthropology, in THE ACCOMPANIMENT: ASSEMBLING THE 
CONTEMPORARY 13, 29 (2011) (“What we do as anthropologists is construct interpretations of 
what we take to be other peoples’ realities. The writing of ethnography is what makes us 
anthropologists. We create fictions. These ethnographic fictions are constructs of other people’s 
constructs.”) 
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  [W]hen culture is closely analyzed, we find but a series of patterned 
reactions that characterize the behavior of the members of a given group. That 
is, we find people reacting, people behaving, people thinking, people 
rationalizing. Under these circumstances, it becomes clear that what we do is 
to reify, that is, objectify and make concrete, the experiences of individuals in 
a group at a given time. These we gather into a totality we call their culture. 
And, for purposes of study, this is quite proper. The danger point is reached 
when we reify similarities in behavior that only result from the similar 
conditioning of a group of individuals to their common setting into something 
that exists outside man . . . This does not mean that we deny the usefulness, for 
certain anthropological problems, of studying culture as if it had an objective 
existence. But we must not allow the recognition of a methodological need to 
obscure the fact that we are dealing with a construct . . . .58 
A second reason for caution, then, is that we have tended to reify “culture” as 
if it has an objective existence. 
C. Excuse 
Third, and more dangerous, when used to explain observed differences in 
behavior or outcomes, “culture” can become a counterproductive substitute for 
thought. Here, “culture” could fall into the same category, or be pressed into 
the same service, as Gregory Bateson’s “black box.” Bateson explains, via an 
imaginary dialogue between a father and daughter: 
A ‘black box’ is a conventional agreement between scientists to stop trying to 
explain things at a certain point. I guess it’s usually a temporary agreement 
. . . . It’s a word that comes from the engineers. When they draw a diagram of a 
complicated machine, they use a sort of shorthand. Instead of drawing all the 
details, they put a box to stand for a whole bunch of parts and label the box 
with what the bunch of parts is supposed to do. 
Daughter: So a ‘black box’ is a label for what a bunch of things are supposed 
to do . . . . 
Father: That’s right. But it’s not an explanation of how the bunch works.59 
A “black box,” then, can stand for a series of elements understood to stand 
in relation to each other without attempting to explain how, in conjunction with 
each other, they work. If used thoughtlessly (i.e., without careful consideration 
about what is meant within), the “black box” of “culture” can become a default 
stand-in for explanation, inquiry, or thought, actually empty of content. The 
use of the term “culture” in comparative legal scholarship often stands as an 
example of the lure of the empty referent. When we do not understand why a 
law works one way in Missouri but a different way in Mississippi or yet a 
 
 58. HERSKOVITS, supra note 18, at 13; see also RABINOW, supra note 57, at 15. 
 59. GREGORY BATESON, Metalogue: What is an Instinct?, in STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF 
MIND 38, 39–40 (1983). 
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different way in Ukraine, “culture” may be offered as a reason, without further 
elaboration or specificity. As a facile substitution for explanation, then, the 
term “culture” can become a parking lot for sloppy thinking about causality. 
In this usage, “culture” can also become a blanket label for difference, and 
when used in that way, it can do us a disservice in a number of different ways. 
One is that it lumps together others’ differences into an unanalyzed and 
unanalyzable mass. Another is that it allows us to take for granted our own 
culture, the way we are, even who “we” are. It can facilitate the unexamined 
reception of normative categories. In that, it can strip us of the opportunity to 
exercise “comparative consciousness.”60 “Culture,” if offered as an explanation 
in and of itself, can become a substitute for thinking carefully or specifically.61 
D. Orientalizing 
One more related word of caution regarding culture: “culture,” used 
carelessly, can become a technology for essentializing. To repeat Herskovits’s 
admonition: “The danger point is reached when we reify similarities in 
behavior that only result from the similar conditioning of a group of 
individuals to their common setting into something that exists outside man . . . 
.”62 This is related to the assumption that a culture is (or can be) a “bounded” 
group which one still may meet. Anthropologists warn that investigation into 
culture can, with reification, turn into asserting “essential” qualities of one’s 
own group or others’.63 The use of the concept of culture as cover for 
essentializing approximates what Edward Said called “Orientalizing,” which 
he warned against, more than three decades ago.64 In this, too, deploying the 
term “culture” in comparative law can become dangerous when it is accepted 
as a substitute for thinking. 
 
 60. Laura Nader, Comparative Consciousness, in ASSESSING CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
84, 86 (Robert Borofsky ed., 1994). 
 61. This is the most significant objection Adam Kuper raises against “culture” that I share. 
See KUPER, supra note 32. 
 62. HERSKOVITS, supra note 18, at 13. 
 63. See, e.g., Andrew Apter, Africa, Empire, and Anthropology: A Philological Exploration 
of Anthropology’s Heart of Darkness, 28 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 580–81 (1999) 
(“[D]oes not an implicit racial logic—cloaked in the essentializing categories of native 
administration and customary law—slip unnoticed through the back door? Insofar as modern 
Africanist ethnography has sought pristine models of social structures . . . and systems of 
thought . . . has it not endorsed the fundamental objectifying, essentializing, and even implicit 
racializing of imperial science at large?”); see also, e.g., Thomas Abercrombie, To Be Indian, to 
Be Bolivian: “Ethnic” and “National” Discourses of Identity, in NATION-STATES AND INDIANS 
IN LATIN AMERICA 95, 97–98 (Greg Urban & Joel Sherzer eds., 1991) (warning against falling 
victim to an “essentializing stereotype of ‘the Indian’” and against “essentializing a Hispanic 
urban culture”) (“In the Andes, an ‘urban,’ ‘Hispanic’ or ‘European’ culture exists, like an 
‘Indian’ one, only when we are studying stereotypes.”). 
 64. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 5 (1979). 
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How susceptible are we to “essentializing” or “Orientalizing”? The title I 
choose for this Article is one example. The original title ran along the lines of 
“Bringing Comparison Home.” As I thought about comparative law and the 
concept of culture, I realized that the lure of the exotic “other” is part of the 
construct, part of the air we breathe and water we drink (a metaphor that works 
as long as we understand that it is air we have engineered for ourselves and 
water we have synthesized). The title of this Article should arouse suspicion. 
The perplexing erotic might be a draw;65 the elision of erotic and exotic, if 
history is a guide, is a danger. 
The foregoing argues that the concept of culture, and tools developed for 
studying it, has much to offer comparative analysis. However, this 
endorsement issues cautiously, and the argument proceeds to identify several 
common pitfalls in drawing on concepts of culture. One helpful start may be 
taking a “components approach,” and zeroing in on a particular facet of culture 
in working on a particular problem, for example, language and speech acts to 
understand how constitutions constitute. Even this approach bears a caveat 
against assuming a fixed category, a reified object, or stasis. Language, in 
living usage, is not a fixed set of combinations of phonemes. It is more like an 
aggregation of the probabilities of finding certain things in relation to each 
other, or finding certain patterns, probabilities with which speakers 
pragmatically play. 
And here, one last caveat is in order, parting company with Kuper. Once 
analysis of a particular component has been undertaken, it can also distort the 
picture if one fails to “put the pieces back together,” to reassemble a wider 
picture to see how the component under analysis works within a broader frame. 
This returns us to the tradition in American anthropology of taking a holistic 
view of culture. As “proof of concept,” the following Part briefly describes 
how the concept of culture has been deployed by two American 
anthropologists in the service of larger projects. 
IV.  THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE, DEPLOYED 
A. Culture Against Race 
It would be useful at this point to review how the concept of culture has 
been deployed in larger arguments, and to what effect. This review offers two 
examples. In the first, from early in its history, American anthropology uses 
the concept of culture in a fight against a particular manifestation of 
ethnocentrism, racism. This project is most prominently associated with the 
German-Jewish father of American study of culture, Franz Boas. The 
 
 65. William Desmond, Being, Determination, and Dialectic, in BEING AND DIALECTIC: 
METAPHYSICS AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE (William Desmond and Joseph Grange, eds., 2000). 
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challenge that faced Boas in the late 1800s and early into the 1900s was that 
Americans and Europeans observed differences in material culture, between 
groups that produced particular material goods like guns or locomotive 
engines, and others that did not. From observations of difference in material 
culture, Boas’s contemporaries evinced a tendency to draw inferences about 
racially-based aptitudes. Why did Americans and Europeans have certain 
weapons, or modes of transport, or other seeming advantages in technology 
and forms of material culture as compared with other groups, in other parts of 
the world? Some inferred that the capacity to create certain forms of 
technological innovation was based on racially based aptitudes. 
Boas entered the fray with systematic study of groups’ differences based 
on long-term residence, careful observation, and close discussion with the 
people that he studied to learn the ways that they categorized their own 
experience.66 Boas argued that the scope of human history—the stuff of 
anthropology, considering what makes us human since the early origins of the 
species—argues against any kind of racial determinism.67 He reminded his 
audiences and readerships of the empirical evidence of great building projects 
in human antiquity, among groups that subsequently lost technological 
advantage over others who in turn left their own impressive relics.68 He also 
reminded his contemporaries that even the great building civilizations of 
antiquity, of Mesopotamia or the upper Nile, were never composed of one 
“racial” group but rather incorporated cosmopolitan mixes of peoples.69 Boas 
ruled out race: of the many things that might lead to certain kinds of 
technological breakthroughs or relative advantages, race was not among 
them.70 In its place, he argued “culture.” It was a shared, learned body of 
knowledge passed down from person to person within a group, rather than a set 
 
 66. See, e.g., Franz Boas, A Year among the Eskimo, 19 BULL. AM. GEOG. SOC’Y 383 
(1887), reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 
1883-1911, 44−45, (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974). 
 67. See, e.g., Franz Boas, Human Faculty as Determined by Race, Address as Vice-President 
of Section H before the Section of Anthropology of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science at the Brooklyn Meeting, August 1894, in 43 Proceedings 301 (1894), 
reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 
221, 221−42 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974) [hereinafter Boas, Human Faculty]. 
 68. See, e.g., Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, Address at the International 
Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, September 1904, in 5 CONGRESS OF ARTS AND 
SCIENCE, 468 (H.J. Rogers, ed., 1906), reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF 
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 23, 34 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974) [hereinafter 
Boas, History of Anthropology Address]. 
 69. Id. at 29. 
 70. See, e.g., Franz Boas, Human Faculty, supra note 67; see also George W. Stocking, Jr., 
The Basic Assumptions of Boasian Anthropology, in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF 
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 1, 6 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed. 1974) [hereinafter 
Stocking, Basic Assumptions]; Rabinow, supra note 57, at 14. 
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of aptitudes based on racial superiority or inferiority, that determined what got 
built and what did not, what forms of material culture became manifest or not 
in a given place.71 
After Boas, generations of anthropologists have redeployed the concept of 
culture in the argument against racism.72 Part of the anthropological tradition 
of ethnography, an attempt at holistic treatment, supported the insight that 
more visible manifestations of culture like buildings or machines are not safe 
grounds for inferences about simplicity or complexity of less visible 
manifestations, such as cosmology, of human reasoning, aptitude, or thought. 
Boas’s legacy includes a second step in his deployment of the concept of 
culture as an alternative explanation for differences that others linked to race or 
ethnicity. He also argued not only that our measures were misleading, but that 
the yardstick itself was rigged; that we measured others by a yardstick that was 
itself a product of our own culture whereas others are only fairly measured by 
their own yardsticks.73 He deployed the concept of culture against a cognitive 
bias that we now refer to as “ethnocentrism,”74 the second step in his larger 
project of arguing against racial or other sub-group bases of superiority or 
inferiority. The widespread acceptance of the concept of cultural relativism is 
one of the great achievements of Boas’s work,75 accomplished with the 
conceptual tool of the concept of culture. 
B. Culture Against Ideology 
Recall that Boas found culture manifest in material items and in ideas. He 
used the concept of culture to argue against contemporaries who looked at 
differences in material manifestations of culture—e.g., certain forms of 
technology—and inferred the superiority or inferiority of groups. Materially 
based, racist logic may be more suspect today, but a parallel to the logic that 
Boas encountered does hold currency among some today: inferring superiority 
or inferiority of groups based on perceived differences in ideational 
manifestations of culture. A second major project in which I find the concept 
of culture deployed is in argument against this tendency. 
 
 71. See, e.g., Boas, History of Anthropology Address, supra note 68; see also Stocking, 
Basic Assumptions, supra note 70, at 3. 
 72. See, e.g., Race: Are We So Different?, AM. ANTHROP. SOC’Y, http://www.understanding 
race.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (public education project on race conducted under the aegis 
of the American Anthropological Society). 
 73. See, e.g., Boas, History of Anthropology Address, supra note 68, at 31. 
 74. See, e.g., Stocking, Basic Assumptions, supra note 70, at 6; Rabinow, supra note 57, at 
18. 
 75. Rabinow, supra note 57, at 20. 
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I find one example of this work in contemporary anthropologist Laura 
Nader’s analysis of the function of an ideology of “the rule of law.”76 Just as 
some of Boas’s contemporaries sought to export perceived advantages of 
material culture, some of Nader’s contemporaries perceive others as lacking 
“the rule of law” (or forms of economic development thought contingent upon 
it), and therefore in need of intervention.77 Just as some of Boas’s 
contemporaries were moved to act out of a sense of charitable pity, efforts to 
export the “rule of law,” moved by others’ perceived lack, become self-
justifying. Nader’s work could be seen as building on Boas’s project, 
deploying the concept of culture to explore dubious inferences about origins of 
perceived inferiority in material conditions or systems of ideas. 
This is where we see an advantage to reassembling pieces of the puzzle 
Kuper has had us take apart. Both Boas’s and Nader’s argumentation shows 
how the culture, conceptualized holistically, can challenge certain forms of 
cognitive bias. In these interrelationships, traceable because of a holistic 
consideration of difference, the workings of power to shape the frame within 
which discourses are produced become more visible. 
C. Bringing Comparison Home: Culture in Comparative Law 
In the previous Parts, after cautioning against troubles that can result from 
misuse of the concept of culture, I attempted to show how tools developed to 
study culture might be used in comparative law. I suggest that the tools of 
anthropology might be adapted for use in comparative law, and advocate two 
different steps. The first would be to take Kuper’s suggestion to analyze 
components of culture relevant to a given problem. The second would be to 
reassemble as many components as one can synthesize to get a more holistic 
picture of how both problem and solutions get produced. 
To outline the analytic that could result from my proposals, let us consider 
as an example a hypothetical project researching the mystery Tribe’s work 
raises, how a Constitution constitutes. The investigator could look with 
specificity at a particular component of culture, authorized speech acts like 
laws or constitutions, to analyze probabilities that certain elements occur in 
relation to one another: for example, the probability of a relationship 
between certain assertions and certain signals of acceptance (as constitutional, 
 
 76. See generally UGO MATTEI AND LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS 
ILLEGAL (2008). 
 77. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION 
BUILDING (2004) (explaining Feldman’s own participation in the U.S.-installed Coalition 
Provisional Authority after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in an effort to draft a new Iraqi constitution, 
and calling for a more humble approach to U.S. efforts at “nation-building”); see also Kareem 
Fahim, Have a Nice Country, THE VILLAGE VOICE (June 22, 2004), http://www.villagevoice. 
com/2004-06-22/news/have-a-nice-country/1/ (describing Feldman’s drafting efforts). 
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legally binding, or authoritative). She could then identify ideologies—
formulated as precepts or propositions—that have become instrumental in their 
institutionalization, as Tribe has done, and infer, as Tribe has also done, 
cognitive processes that may have given rise to those propositions and 
precepts. This would provide adequate grounding to step back and examine the 
frames of performance in which authority and convention are produced, to 
ascertain whose speech acts hold authority and why, or which ideologies end 
up within an “invisible Constitution,” which do not, and why. 
This process could end up telling us something about how a given 
constitution, including its unwritten dimensions, constitutes. Culture, instead of 
being a peremptory answer, then becomes a heuristic, a means to 
understanding, frames of performance within which discourse produces literal 
meaning and in parallel produces and reproduces speech act communities. To 
speak more generally, examining component parts of culture can illuminate 
broader processes like the constitution of power, authority, or ideology; or 
probabilities of acceptance, rejection, reiteration, breakdown, or 
institutionalization. 
CONCLUSION 
Althusser points out for us that to continue producing something, one must 
reproduce the thing itself but one must also reproduce the things that are 
necessary for reproduction.78 To continue producing shoes, one must not only 
continue making shoes; there must be a system for reproducing leather, laces, 
lasts, and even the know-how and workforce that fashions those materials into 
shoes. Likewise, to reproduce discourse, one must not only produce the 
discourse itself but also the things necessary for discursive production. In not 
looking at what produces the frame within which discourse is produced—in 
not looking at how the propositions that make up his “invisible Constitution” 
get produced—Tribe and others wishing to understand how invisible 
Constitutions constitute miss out on something fundamentally constitute: 
power. 
Comparative law has traditionally suffered, at least in the United States, 
from overly restricting itself to geographically based jurisdictions as its unit of 
analysis, as the performance frame on which it relies to define its subject. The 
traditional comparative law project would be to compare some aspect of the 
law of different jurisdictions, say, the law of France to the law of China. The 
utility of thinking about culture, when we are thinking through questions of 
law, religion, and invisible constitutions, is that culture allows us to slice at a 
different angle. It opens the door to new projects; we can compare the speech 
 
 78. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an 
Investigation, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85, 86 (2001). 
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acts of a religious community to the speech acts of a legal community within 
one locale and see where there are overlaps, where there are not. Among other 
benefits, whereas comparative law has traditionally concentrated on different 
jurisdictional practices, the concept of culture and other tools of anthropology 
developed to investigate particular components of culture allow us to bring 
comparison home and to look comparatively at frames of discursive 
performance that constitute communities of speech, and forms of authority and 
power within them. 
 
